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ABSTRACT 
Without concrete legislative guidance, courts are left to a variety of 
unsatisfactory methods of determining the disposition of frozen embryos 
in dissolutions and custody disputes. Beginning in 1992, courts have been 
issuing problematic rulings that are reached through the application of 
three approaches: (1) the balancing-interests test; (2) the contemporaneous 
mutual consent approach; and (3) the contractual approach. These 
approaches are examined in this Comment through the lens of selected 
cases and the largely inequitable outcomes for parties are critiqued. Courts 
even lament the lack of statutory guidance in deciding these disputes but 
are resigned to employing these largely flawed, inequitable approaches. 
This Comment goes on to address the statutes already in place in a handful 
of states—but even where there are statutes in effect, they fail to 
adequately address the issue and guide the courts in determining the 
disposition of frozen embryos. After critically examining selected statutes 
from states with more progressive statutes, as well as those with more 
conservative guidelines, this Comment proposes a model statute for states 
to use as a framework when enacting new legislation to address this 
increasingly pressing issue. As case after case suggests, legislation is 
sorely needed to provide a guiding light for courts as couples litigate the 
disposition of frozen embryos. The model statute uses courts’ favored 
contractual approach and the current statutes, namely those enacted in 
California and Florida, as a starting point. This Comment concludes that 
the best protocol to resolve custody disputes is for states to enact 
legislation providing that contractual arrangements between couples 
beginning the in vitro fertilization process must be honored in the face of 
custody disputes and further suggests that required mediation be employed 
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when the contract cannot be upheld. This approach endorses procreational 
autonomy and prevents the delivery of more inequitable results to parties 
litigating the disposition of their embryos during dissolutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 1978 marked a permanent shift in family law dynamics: 
Louise Brown was born in England, and her birth was the first to result 
from in vitro fertilization (IVF).1 Three years later, in 1981, Elizabeth Carr 
was born in the United States from IVF.2 In 1984, the first child produced 
from a frozen embryo,3 named Zoe, was born in Australia.4 These births 
are landmarks in history and provided hope for infertile couples; however, 
the emerging field of IVF also inexorably changed the landscape of 
custody disputes in family law cases, raising new questions about 
personhood, parental rights, and procreational autonomy. 
IVF is a commonly sought alternative to the natural conception 
process as a result of infertility struggles. Infertility is defined as the 
inability to conceive within twelve months.5 According to the 2016 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Fertility Clinic Success Rates 
Report published in October 2018, a total of 263,577 ART cycles occurred 
nationally, with 934 of those cycles using “fresh” embryos from frozen 
non-donor eggs.6 As of July 2018, more than eight million births had 
occurred through IVF since Louise Brown’s birth.7 The process itself 
includes multiple steps including ovulation induction, egg retrieval, sperm 
retrieval, fertilization, and embryo transfer (or freezing).8 A woman using 
her eggs takes synthetic hormones to cause her body to produce multiple 
eggs, as opposed to the single egg that naturally develops every month, 
                                                     
 1. Louise Brown, Louise Brown on 40 Years of IVF: ‘I Was the World’s First IVF Baby, This Is 
My Story’, INDEPENDENT: INDY/LIFE (July 25, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/health-and-families/ivf-baby-louise-brown-story-test-tube-world-first-40th-anniversary-
a8455956.html [https://perma.cc/KV7E-DNNM]. 
 2. Lisa Schencker, World’s First and America’s First IVF Babies Meet in Chicago for First 
Time, CHI. TRIB. (June 17, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-first-ivf-babies-meet-
0617-biz-20170616-story.html [https://perma.cc/85AM-ZQ5A]. 
 3. Although “pre-embryo” is the technical term, this Comment will conform with the 
colloquialism: “embryo.” 
 4. First Baby Born of Frozen Embryo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 1984), https://www.nytimes. 
com/1984/04/11/us/first-baby-born-of-frozen-embryo.html [https://perma.cc/93SJ-TC5X]. 
 5. Infertility: Symptoms, Treatment, Diagnosis, UCLA HEALTH, http://obgyn.ucla.edu/infertility 
[https://perma.cc/2867-NYJQ]. 
 6. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, 2016 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT (2018). 
 7. Eur. Soc’y of Human Reproduction and Embryology, More than 8 Million Babies Born from 
IVF Since the World’s First in 1978, SCI. DAILY (July 3, 2018), https://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2018/07/180703084127.htm [https://perma.cc/5M72-49GY]; see also Brown, supra note 1. 
 8. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-
procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac-20384716 [https://perma.cc/W4PW-MAA3]. 
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and the eggs are then retrieved by a physician (usually) through a 
transvaginal ultrasound.9 The male will then provide a semen sample and 
the egg will be fertilized.10 Because the synthetic hormones taken by the 
woman cause the production of a large number of eggs, there are more 
embryos produced than will be transferred to the uterus at a single time; 
therefore, embryos may be frozen for storage and possible future use.11 
Cryopreservation allows the fertilization of all harvested eggs, creating 
extra embryos for transfer during later IVF cycles.12 Further, it prevents 
the woman from the burden of repeated cycles of egg retrieval if more than 
one cycle is necessary.13 
Cryogenically preserved embryos may remain frozen for years 
before being used.14 It is unsurprising, then, that when couples do divorce, 
the frozen embryos become the center of custody battles. Without a proper 
statutory response, courts facing the issue of embryonic disposition for the 
first time are forced to look to inconsistent rulings and inequitable 
outcomes as a guiding light. The lack of statutory direction is a growing 
problem for courts when trying to make a determination of which party is 
entitled to custody of the embryos in divorce disputes.15 
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the three major 
frameworks applied by courts that determine embryo disposition. Part II 
explains, analyzes, and critiques current statutes. Part III, using current 
statutes and case law as a basis, will propose a model statute as a solution 
                                                     
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Carl L. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights 
Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 60 (1999); see also Gary A. Debele & 
Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues Surrounding Embryos and Gametes: What Family Law Practitioners 
Need to Know, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 55, 63 (2018) (discussing the rapid progression of IVF 
technology allowing for cryopreservation of early-stage embryos; the opportunities arising from this 
rapid progression require courts to consider new categories of parents and the status of frozen embryos, 
leading to the categorizations of genetic, intended, or gestational parents). The cryopreservation of 
embryos leads to dispositional choices such as disposal or donation. See, e.g., Andrew Hough, 1.7 
Million Human Embryos Created for IVF Thrown Away, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/9772233/1.7-million-human-embryos-created-for-IVF-thrown-
away.html [https://perma.cc/7RY9-M43F]; Jasmine Taylor-Coleman, The Americans Who “Adopt” 
Other People’s Embryos, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
36450328 [https://perma.cc/W4PW-MAA3]. 
 12. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
407, 408 (1990). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Coleman, supra note 11, at 60 (stating that practitioners estimate embryos can remain 
cryogenically preserved for up to fifty years). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Jessica L. Lambert, Developing a Legal Framework for 
Resolving Disputes Between “Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions 
of Divorce Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529, 547 (2008) (“Though not explicitly 
delineated in the Constitution, the right to procreative liberty exists in constitutional notions of liberty 
and privacy.”). 
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to the epidemic of inequity in courts across the country.16 This statutory 
solution will safeguard procreational autonomy while emphasizing the 
importance of a binding agreement at the outset of IVF treatment that will 
prevent the need for future litigation concerning the disposition of frozen 
embryos. 
I. CASE HISTORY 
Since 1992, courts have been exploring the nuances in applying the 
contractual approach, the balancing-interests approach, and the 
contemporaneous mutual consent approach.17 Davis v. Davis set the tone 
for future decisions regarding the disposition of embryos. Following the 
footsteps of the Davis court, other courts have operated under the same 
analytical frameworks for the past twenty-seven years.18 Although courts 
generally agree that the contractual approach is appropriate when couples 
state their intent regarding the disposition of their embryos, when there is 
no agreement, the balancing-interests test is employed.19 This section 
addresses the three approaches utilized by courts, the use of the balancing 
approach due to the lack of binding agreements, and the inherent flaws in 
weighing one person’s fundamental right to procreate against another’s 
right to avoid procreation. 
A. Davis v. Davis 
The issue of the disposition of frozen embryos first appeared before 
the court in 1992 when Junior Davis and Mary Sue Davis brought the 
custody issue to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.20 Appealing the court 
of appeals’ custody award to Junior, Mary Sue was, once again, denied 
custody of the frozen embryos. All terms of the parties’ dissolution were 
agreed upon, except for the disposition of seven frozen embryos stored in 
a Knoxville fertility clinic.21 
                                                     
 16. See generally In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 
174 (N.Y. 1998); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn. 1992). 
 17. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. This was the first case where a court was asked to determine the 
disposition of frozen embryos. 
 18. Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition upon Divorce, 29 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 239 (2013) (stating that courts have consistently applied the analytical 
frameworks set out in Davis, which “have generally proven workable”). 
 19. See id. Courts in New York, Oregon, Texas, Alabama, and Washington have applied the 
contractual approach. Id. at n.19. The contemporaneous mutual consent model has been applied in 
fewer states, notably Massachusetts and Iowa. Id. at n.98. 
 20. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588. 
 21. Id. at 589. 
2019] Family Law's Coldest War 297 
The case presented an issue of first impression, with Mary Sue 
desiring control of the frozen embryos to be transferred post-divorce.22 
The trial court’s order was reversed, giving custody to the wife on the basis 
that the husband had a “constitutionally protected right not to beget a child 
where no pregnancy [had] taken place . . . [and] there is no compelling 
state interest to justify . . . ordering implantation against the will of either 
party.”23 At the time of the court’s decision, both parties had remarried, 
and Mary Sue petitioned for authority to donate the frozen embryos to a 
childless couple. Junior Davis, on the other hand, opposed a donation and 
expressed the preference that the frozen embryos be discarded.24 If an 
initial agreement existed regarding the control of the embryos in the event 
of divorce, the question posed to the Davis court might have been easier 
to answer,25 as is made evident by the court’s creation of three different 
analyses: (1) the contractual approach, (2) the balancing-interests 
approach, and (3) the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.26 
In its analysis regarding the disposition of embryos, the Davis court 
held that an agreement made by the parties regarding the disposition of 
frozen embryos should be presumed valid and enforceable.27 The court 
reasoned, “[T]his conclusion is in keeping with the proposition that the 
progenitors, having provided the genetic material giving rise to the 
[preembryos], retain decision-making authority as to their disposition.”28 
In proposing this analysis, the court included the caveat that initial 
agreements should be modifiable if both parties agree to protect couples 
from the risk of one party not providing truly informed consent, but 
otherwise, the prior agreements are considered binding.29 
                                                     
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 590. 
 25. Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (And the Business): Recent 
Trends in Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2009) (stating that 
an initial agreement would have factored into the court’s analysis and helped make its decision, but 
the Davises never reached such an agreement). 
 26. Flannery, supra note 18, at 237–38. 
 27. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. While recognizing the importance and enforceability of original contractual 
arrangements, the court also recognized the volatility of human emotion. As part of its holding, the 
court concluded that initial agreements ought to be enforced, but at the same time it “recognize[d] that 
life is not static, and that human emotions run particularly high when a married couple is attempting 
to overcome infertility problems.” Id. Due to the emotional turbulence involved in contracting during 
the IVF process, the parties’ initial informed consent might not be genuinely informed; anticipating 
the emotional and psychological repercussions of the events of the IVF process is almost impossible 
to predict. Id.; see also April J. Walker, His, Hers or Ours?-Who Has the Right to Determine the 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos after Separation or Divorce?, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 41–42 
(2008) (noting that, even if the parties agreed on the disposition of the embryos at the start of the IVF 
process, the parties are likely to change their minds during the separation or divorce process). 
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When there is no agreement, or the initial agreement is no longer 
agreed upon by the parties, courts are forced to step into dangerous 
territory. In Davis, the parties had not executed an agreement before 
dissolution.30 As such, the court was forced to implement a different test 
which required a person versus property analysis.31 The court found that 
the value of the frozen embryos rests in the “potential to become, after 
implantation, growth and birth, children.”32 The potential for human life 
and the possibility parties will become parents turns on the parties’ 
exercise of their constitutional right to privacy.33 The concern for the 
constitutional right to privacy then triggered the right to procreate.34 The 
court stated, “[T]he essential dispute here is not where or how long to store 
the preembryos, but whether the parties will become parents . . . [w]e 
conclude that the answer to this dilemma turns on the parties’ exercise of 
their constitutional right to privacy.”35 The court was then forced to 
convolutedly balance each party’s right to procreate and right not to 
procreate.36 In this case, awarding custody to Mary Sue would impose 
unwanted parenthood on Junior Davis, along with the attendant financial 
and psychological consequences.37 On the other hand, IVF is an extremely 
taxing process for a woman, and refusal to permit donation or award 
custody would “impose on her the burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF 
                                                     
 30. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 598–99 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which 
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law”). 
 34. Id. But see McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that 
the embryos were marital property of a unique character); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 
(Wash. 2002) (stating that it was not necessary to engage in any discussion as to the legal status of the 
embryos and limiting the decision based solely upon the contractual rights of the parties). 
 35. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600 (holding that in terms of the Tennessee state constitution, the right 
of procreation is a vital part of an individual’s right to privacy, and that federal law is to the same 
effect). But see Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes over Frozen Embryos & the “Right Not to Be a Parent,” 
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128, 138 (2003) (“Not only do the courts in the preembryo dispute cases 
apply the right to privacy in an unconventional, and most likely unconstitutional, form by transforming 
a right to be free from government interference into a right that individuals may enforce against one 
another, they may have violated the privacy of both parties by inquiring into the substantive details of 
a uniquely private agreement.”). 
 36. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. 
 37. The court noted the psychological consequences of imposing parenthood on Junior Davis 
because of his childhood trauma. Id. at 603–04. Following his parents’ divorce and the nervous 
breakdown of his mother, Junior Davis was only able to have monthly visits with his mother and only 
saw his father three more times before he died. Id. The separation from his parents caused him severe 
problems, and he believed he suffered because of his inability to forge a relationship with his parents. 
Id. As a result, he adamantly opposed fathering a child who could not live with both parents; he also 
opposed donating the embryos because the receiving couple might divorce, which would deprive the 
child of being raised by two parents. Id.  
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procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to which 
she contributed genetic material would never become children.”38 
The Davis court, applying the balancing-interests test, concluded that 
Junior’s interest in not being a parent outweighed Mary Sue’s interest in 
donation.39 The court commented that the case would have been closer if 
Mary Sue were seeking custody to parent the children herself, but only if 
she could not achieve parenthood through other reasonable means.40 The 
court concluded that the party wishing to avoid procreation should usually 
prevail, so long as the other party has a “reasonable possibility of 
achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in 
question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in 
favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be 
considered.”41 
Despite acknowledging the trauma of the IVF process, the court 
viewed another IVF process as a reasonable opportunity for Mary Sue to 
achieve parenthood.42 In Davis, the court weighed one substantial trauma 
against another: the court did not draw a definite conclusion as to why the 
psychological trauma Junior may have experienced by being forced to 
question his parental status was more significant than Mary Sue’s interest 
in donating the embryos—or even in having children using the embryos—
or the emotional, financial, and physical trauma Mary Sue would have to 
experience by undertaking IVF process all over again.43 
                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. In supporting its reasoning, the Davis court cited Junior’s childhood struggles and stated: 
If [Mary Sue] were allowed to donate these preembryos, [Junior Davis] would face a 
lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his parental status 
but having no control over it. He testified quite clearly that if these [preembryos] were 
brought to term he would fight for custody of his child or children. Donation, if a child 
came of it, would rob him twice—his procreational autonomy would be defeated and his 
relationship with his offspring would be prohibited. 
Id.; see Strasser, supra note 25, at 1175. Strasser notes that Mary Sue could have had legitimate reasons 
for choosing to donate the frozen embryos to a childless couple; she may have valued being a genetic 
parent and wanted to donate the embryos to another couple because Junior would not have to face the 
financial responsibility as the legal father. Id. Strasser goes on to say, “Regardless of why Mary Sue 
wanted to donate the embryos, someone else might want to donate them precisely because she would 
receive psychic benefit just from knowing that she had become a genetic parent.” Id.; see also, 
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding that the trial court did not 
err in finding that Karla Dunston’s interests trumped Jacob Szafranski’s based on evidence that the 
embryos represented Karla’s last and only opportunity to have a biological child from her eggs); 
Madeleine Schwartz, Who Owns Pre-Embryos?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www. 
newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/who-owns-pre-embryos [https://perma.cc/3YV5-MRY7] 
(providing an editorial perspective on Szafranski v. Dunston). 
 41. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Strasser, supra note 25, at 1178–79. Strasser notes that Mary Sue’s eggs were harvested 
when the Davis’s marriage was unstable, and Junior Davis hoped that the birth of a child would 
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Further, the court assumed that Mary Sue would be able to undergo 
the process again. Notwithstanding the physical and emotional turmoil 
involved with the process, the financial burden alone can be a deterrent.44 
In weighing the procreational autonomy of one party against another, the 
court essentially stripped Mary Sue of her right to use the embryos to have 
a child by preserving Junior’s right to avoid parenthood.45 Essentially—
and perhaps inadvertently—in applying the balancing-interests test, the 
Davis court set a precedent resulting in too many inequitable outcomes. 
B. Kass v. Kass 
The dispositional dispute over frozen embryos reared its ugly head 
in a New York court as an issue of first impression.46 In Kass, the parties 
executed an informed consent document that expressly stated their intent 
that the frozen embryos “be examined by the IVF Program for biological 
studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research 
                                                     
improve their relationship. Id. at 1179. If Junior Davis was willing to bring a child into the relationship 
in the hope it would improve the relationship, then he must not have been, as Strasser states, 
[I]nalterably opposed to permitting children genetically related to him to be brought into a 
home where the adults might eventually part ways . . . his actions during the marriage 
belied his commitment to never wanting to father children who might not be living in a 
two-parent home. . . . [E]ven were it true that Junior or someone like him might feel badly 
about being genetically connected to a child raised by other, the court seemed unwilling to 
consider that an analogous argument might be made about the feelings of the parent who 
wants the embryos donated, i.e., that he or she might feel terribly were the embryos 
discarded rather than given the opportunity to flourish. 
Id. For a further critique, however indirect, of the balancing approach, see Nick Loeb, Sofia Vergara’s 
Ex-Fiancé: Our Frozen Embryos Have a Right to Live, N.Y. TIMES (APR. 29, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/opinion/sofiavergaras-ex-fiance-our-frozen-embryos-have-a-
right-to-live.html [https://perma.cc/A59Q-LVWS]. 
 44. The national average for beginning an IVF cycle is $12,000 before medications, which alone 
vary from $3,000 to $5,000, totaling (conservatively) $18,000; the frozen cycle, when frozen embryos 
are transferred rather than “fresh” embryos, averages between $3,000 and $5,000. Jennifer G. 
Uffalussy, The Cost of IVF: 4 Things I Learned While Battling Infertility, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2014/02/06/the-cost-of-ivf-4-things-i-learned-while-battling-
infertility/#f40616e24dd6 [https://perma.cc/TN2S-8DWJ]. 
 45. See Strasser, supra note 25, at 1176–77. Strasser writes: 
The Davis court cautioned that it would not have been willing to override Junior’s wishes 
unless Mary Sue had no other reasonable options. Mary Sue’s interest in being a genetic 
parent combined with her interest in nurturing a child biologically related to her might not 
have overcome Junior’s interest in not being a genetic parent. 
Id. 
 46. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. 174 (N.Y. 1988). In Kass, the parties married in 1988. Id. at 175. 
Maureen Kass was unable to conceive a child naturally, so the parties enrolled in the Long Island IVF 
program and signed four consent forms provided by the hospital. Id. at 175–76. The parties underwent 
ten unsuccessful attempts to have a child. Id. at 176. The parties made one more attempt to conceive, 
this time using Maureen Kass’s sister as a surrogate. Id. at 177. When no pregnancy resulted, and 
Maureen’s sister refused to continue as the surrogate, the parties almost immediately dissolved their 
marriage. Id. 
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investigation as determined by the IVF Program.”47 Maureen Kass later 
determined that she was opposed to the destruction or release of the 
embryos and petitioned for sole custody of the frozen embryos so that she 
could undergo another IVF transfer.48 
The Kass court adopted the Davis reasoning that an initial agreement 
should be enforced in the absence of a subsequent agreement departing 
from the initial agreement.49 The Kass court stated the relevant question—
who had dispositional authority over the frozen embryos—was answered 
by the parties’ agreement.50 
The Kass court stated that agreements between progenitors regarding 
the disposition of their frozen embryos should generally be presumed valid 
and binding, and the agreements should be enforced in any dispute 
between the parties.51 The court went on to state, “[P]arties should be 
encouraged in advance, before embarking on IVF and cryopreservation, to 
think through possible contingencies and carefully specify their wishes in 
writing.”52 
In a case where the parties reach an agreement, and one party later 
changes his or her mind, the court need not engage in a balancing-interests 
approach: the contractual approach should govern.53 The interests of the 
parties do not need to be weighed because the parties have already entered 
into an agreement.54 The contractual approach keeps courts away from 
murky analyses and maintains the parties’ procreational autonomy.55  
C. In re Marriage of Rooks 
Rooks, the most recent state supreme court case on the disposition of 
frozen embryos, adopted the balancing test approach in the absence of 
                                                     
 47. Id. at 176–77. 
 48. Id. at 177. 
 49. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 50. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179. 
 51. Id. at 180. 
 52. Id.; see Strasser, supra note 25, at 1182. Commenting on Kass, Strasser wrote: 
Were such agreements enforceable only when the parties continued to agree with what had 
been originally decided, the agreements would be of relatively little use—either the parties 
would continue to agree about the disposition about the embryos and there would be no 
challenge to the enforcement of the agreement or, if one of the parties had had a change of 
heart, the original agreement would be of no use in determining what to do. 
Id. 
 53. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Knowing that advance agreements will be enforced underscores the seriousness and 
integrity of the consent process.”); Erik W. Johnson, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition 
through Contract, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 793, 800 (2003) (stating that the Kass court’s holding is the 
most appropriate in such cases because a valid prior agreement existed, so the court was not forced to 
apply the balancing-interests approach or determine the legal status of the embryos). 
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statutory instructions.56 In deciding to apply the balancing-interests test, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized the inherent flaws in such an 
approach.57 The court stated that the case “present[ed] difficult issues of 
procreational autonomy for which there are no easy answers because it pits 
one spouse’s right to procreate directly against the other spouse’s 
equivalently important right to avoid procreation, and because the 
fundamental liberty and privacy interests at stake are deeply and 
personally charged.”58 Without statutory direction, though, courts are left 
with a flawed method of weighing parties’ fundamental procreative rights 
against one another. 
The Rooks court held that both parties’ interest in procreational 
autonomy should be honored by the court. In other words, the court held 
an agreement expressing the spouses’ intent regarding the disposition of 
any frozen embryos in the event of divorce should be upheld.59 The court 
held, in the absence of an agreement, the parties’ interests should be 
balanced and provided six factors to consider when weighing the parties’ 
interests.60 
First, the court should consider the intended use of the frozen 
embryos by the party who wants to preserve them. Second, the court must 
consider the physical ability, or lack thereof, of the spouse seeking to 
implant the frozen embryos to have biological children through other 
means. Third, the parties’ original reasons for undergoing IVF should be 
considered. Fourth, the hardship for the party seeking to avoid becoming 
a genetic parent, including emotional, financial, or logistical factors is 
relevant. Fifth, a court should consider a spouse’s demonstrated bad faith 
or attempt to use the frozen embryos as unfair leverage in the divorce 
proceedings. Finally, any other factors relevant to the parties’ specific 
situation should be considered.61 
                                                     
 56. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 581 (Colo. 2018) (“Thus, in the absence of specific 
legislative guidance in these circumstances, we adopt an approach that seeks to balance the parties’ 
interests given the legislature’s general command in dissolution proceedings requiring the court to 
divide marital property equitably.”). 
 57. Id. at 580–81 (stating that the case “fundamentally concerns the disposition of a couple’s 
marital property”). 
 58. Id. at 580. 
 59. Id. (“[C]onsidering the nature and equivalency of the underlying liberty and privacy interests 
at stake, a court presiding over dissolution proceedings should strive, where possible, to honor both 
parties’ interest in procreational autonomy when resolving disputes over a couple’s cryogenically 
preserved frozen embryos.”). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. The court goes on to state that a court should not consider whether the party seeking to 
become a genetic parent is financially stable enough to support a child, nor shall the number of a 
party’s existing children, standing alone, be a reason to deny a party the right to custody of the embryo. 
Id. The court also states that courts should not consider whether the spouse seeking to use the frozen 
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Rooks presented a case where the parties did not have an agreement. 
Ms. Rooks desired to preserve the embryos to be transferred, citing her 
inability to have more children “naturally,” whereas Mr. Rooks desired to 
thaw and discard the embryos because of his wish not to have more 
children from his relationship with Ms. Rooks.62 The Colorado Supreme 
Court held that the court of appeals erred in its employment of the 
balancing test. Its consideration of Ms. Rooks’ already-existing children; 
the potential economic impact of another child; the impact of another child 
on the other children; and its concern for Ms. Rooks’ ability to manage a 
“large family” as a single mother in light of her unemployment, lack of 
financial resources, and the health issues faced by one of the children were 
improper.63 The framework the Colorado Supreme Court formulated while 
applying the balancing-interests approach “recognizes that both spouses 
have equally valid, constitutionally based interests in procreational 
autonomy. It encourages couples to record their mutual consent regarding 
the disposition of remaining [preembryos] in the event of divorce by an 
express agreement.”64 
The Rooks factors, in the absence of statutory language articulating 
a bright-line rule for embryo disposition, help add clarity to the amorphous 
balancing-interests approach. Former cases, such as Davis,65 have not 
applied such in-depth factors when applying the balancing-interests 
approach. However, the framework is still a method of last resort. The 
Rooks court effectively admitted it was a disfavored approach when it 
stated that it would encourage parties to provide for the disposition of their 
embryos through express agreement.66 The court only established the 
factors because the Rooks court had no express agreement designating 
                                                     
embryos to become a genetic parent should instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological 
children. Id. 
 62. Id. at 583. 
 63. Id. at 585 (in articulating the factors to be considered in the balancing-interests test, the Rooks 
court explicitly stated that the financial circumstances and already-existing children of the spouse who 
wishes to preserve the embryos are not to be considered). 
 64. Id. at 594. 
 65. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. The court considered looser factors based on an indefinable 
“interest,” rather than specific factors. Id. For example, the court considered the burden of unwanted 
parenthood on Junior Davis, especially because of his own childhood experience of being separated 
from his parents, Mary Sue’s interest in donating the frozen embryos to another couple to avoid the 
emotional struggle of realizing that the invasive IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and Mary 
Sue’s ability to become a parent by other reasonable means in the future. Id. at 603–04. The Rooks 
factors nuance the Davis factors and are not as dismissive of the desires of the spouse who wishes to 
preserve the frozen embryos to be a genetic parent. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 594. In Rooks, the court stated 
the following: “[B]ecause we conclude the relevant interest at stake is the interest in achieving or 
avoiding genetic parenthood, courts should not consider whether a spouse seeking to use the 
[preembryos] to become a genetic parent could instead adopt a child or otherwise parent non-biological 
parent.” Id. 
 66. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 592. 
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what should be done with the frozen embryos, and no Colorado statute 
indicates disposition in cases of divorce.67 Courts recognize the inherent 
flaws with the balancing-interests test but are left with no legislative 
recourse; thus, the balancing-interests test is reluctantly applied.68 
Rooks demonstrates that, even in 2018, there was still inadequate 
legislative response to the issue of how frozen embryos should be disposed 
or distributed. A lack of statutory resolutions will only result in a 
continuing influx of cases in court, and the courts will have no choice but 
to adopt unsatisfactory approaches in order to reach the most “equitable” 
inequitable solution for the parties.69 
It is evident that the courts are dissatisfied with the approaches they 
are effectively forced to apply. Reber v. Reiss, a Pennsylvania case from 
2012, establishes this when lamenting the lack of legislative guidance on 
the disposition of embryos.70 Without legislative guidance, cases such as 
Davis, Kass, and Rooks will continue to proceed to the courts and more 
unsatisfactory, inequitable results will emerge, further stymieing the 
courts with bad precedent and leaving them reluctant to upset the status 
quo and unable to provide equitable relief to parties that their honor 
procreational autonomy. 
II. EXISTING STATE STATUTORY RESPONSES 
The moral ambiguity surrounding IVF makes it surprising that there 
is not further statutory regulation from states surrounding the process. Out 
of fifty states, few statutes regarding the IVF process or the disposition of 
embryos exist.71 For a field as turbulent as IVF disputes, there are less than 
                                                     
 67. Id. at 591. 
 68. For further reading on the impact of these inequitable results on participants in IVF, see Chris 
Bodenner, A Custody Battle over Embryos, ATLANTIC (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.theatlantic. 
com/notes/2017/02/a-custody-battle-over-embryos/514934/ [http://perma.cc/3YB9-UA7K]. 
 69. See generally Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Reber v. Reiss is another 
example of the unsatisfactory response courts employ when determining the disposition of embryos. 
The Reber court departed from the reasoning in Davis, in which the court stated that, as a general 
matter, the party who has an interest in not procreating should generally outweigh the party’s interest 
in procreating. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. Instead, the Reber court declined 
to treat the husband’s interest in not being a parent as more significant than the wife’s interest in having 
a biological child (which she was unable to do because of a breast cancer diagnosis). Reber, 42 A.3d 
at 1142. Due to a lack of statutory guidance, the court reluctantly applied the balancing-interests 
approach. Id.; see also Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 49 (Tex. App. 2006) (lamenting the absence 
of statutory guidance from the State of Texas, stating, “Noticeably absent from these sections is any 
legislative directive on how to determine the disposition of the embryos in case of a contingency such 
as death or divorce.”). 
 70. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581. See generally Reber, 42 A.3d 1131; Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40. 
 71. Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Cops and Robbers in Assisted Reproduction: Who Is Who as Between 
Cryobanks and Depositors of Gametes (Sperm or Oocytes) and Embryos?, AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF 
FAM. 2014 SPRING CLE CONF. (2014) (listing California, Louisiana, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas. Fruchtman only lists eleven states with statutes addressing 
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twenty statutes concerning the issue—an inadequate number. These 
statutes do not provide a proper legislative response to the cases going to 
court, forcing the courts’ wild card hands and leading to inequitable results 
for parties.72 Many courts admit the need for legislation, stating that the 
courts would be forced to examine cases individually until such a time that 
the legislature finally decides to tackle the issue.73 This section examines 
and critiques selected statutes—some of which do better than others at 
attempting to wrangle with the issue regarding how frozen embryos should 
be treated—and notes the pitfalls or advantages of each. 
A. California 
Beginning with California, the law74 primarily focuses on the duty of 
a provider of fertility treatment to provide the patient with “timely, 
relevant, and appropriate information to allow the individual to make an 
informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of any human 
embryos remaining following the fertility treatment.”75 The statute further 
provides that failure to supply the information to a patient constitutes 
unprofessional conduct.76 California law states that any patient receiving 
fertility treatment shall have options regarding the disposition of any 
unused embryos.77 These options include: (1) storing unused embryos; (2) 
donating the embryos to another individual(s); (3) discarding the embryos; 
or (4) donating the remaining embryos for research.78 
                                                     
the disposition of embryos, but Arizona added itself to the list in 2018 when it enacted its legislation). 
For further reading on the Arizona law, see Alexandra Faver, Whose Embryo Is It Anyway? The Need 
for a Federal Statute Enforcing Frozen Embryo Disposition Contracts, Note, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 633, 
637–38 (2017). 
 72. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §32-
41jj (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (West 
1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111L, § 4 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 & B:18 (West 
2014); N.J. STAT ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 14-20-64(1) (West 2005); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 556 (2000); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 160.706 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-906 (West 2013); see also Uniform Parentage 
Act § 706 (2000) (outlining the legal status of a former spouse to a child resulting from an embryo if 
the marriage was dissolved before the embryo is transferred); Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional 
Parenthood’s Influence: Rethinking Procreative Autonomy and Federal Paternity Establishment 
Policy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 489, 507 (2012) (analyzing the Uniform Parentage Act 
as one that embraces procreative liberty by not imposing undesired legal parentage despite biological 
connection). 
 73. Rooks, 429 P.3d at 581; see also Reber, 42 A.3d at 1131, 1142; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 49. 
 74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2004). 
 75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (West 2004). 
 76. Id. 
 77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(b) (West 2004). Although outside the scope of this 
Comment, for further reading on the legal issues and circumstances surrounding donation, see 
generally Lambert, supra note 15. 
 78. Id. 
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California mandates that the fertility treatment provider shall provide 
a form to the patient(s) that establishes advanced written directives 
regarding the disposition of the embryos.79 The provided form places a 
time limit on possible storage of the embryos at the clinic or storage 
facility while also providing a choice for disposition in the event of 
contingencies, including death, separation, and divorce.80 Finally, patients 
who consider donating the embryos for research must be provided 
informed consent from their medical providers, with specific information 
conveyed to the individual(s).81 California takes its law a step further than 
many states by requiring an advance directive, rather than merely requiring 
health care providers to supply timely, relevant, and appropriate 
information to patients; information is essential, but that information must 
be used to inform a decision at the start of the process.82 
Narrowing in on the section of primary concern—the choices given 
to the partners in the event of divorce or separation—there are six options: 
(1) the embryo shall be made available to the female partner; (2) the 
embryo shall be made available to the male partner; (3) the embryo shall 
be donated for research purposes; (4) the embryo shall be thawed with no 
further action taken; (5) the embryo shall be donated to another couple or 
individual; or (6) the embryo shall be disposed of in another manner that 
                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(b)(1)–(4) (West 2004). 
 81. The donating couples must be informed of the following by the health care provider: (1) a 
statement that the embryos will be used to derive human pluripotent stem cells for research and that 
the cells may be used (at a future time) for human transplantation research; (2) a statement that all 
identifiers associated with the embryos will be removed before the derivation of human pluripotent 
stem cells; (3) a statement that the donors will not receive any information about subsequent testing 
on the embryo or the derived human pluripotent cells; (4) a statement that derived cells or cell lines, 
with all identifiers removed, may be kept for many years; (5) disclosure of the possibility that the 
donated material could have commercial potential, and a statement that the donor(s) will not receive 
any financial or other benefits from any commercial development; (6) a statement that the human 
pluripotent stem cell research is not intended to provide direct medical benefit to the donor(s); and (7) 
a statement that the donated embryos will not be transferred to another woman’s uterus, will not 
survive the human pluripotent stem cell derivation process, and will be handled respectfully. CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(c)(1)–(7) (West 2004). 
 82. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 32–41jj (West 2015) (providing that a health care 
provider shall provide the patient with timely, relevant, and appropriate information to allow the 
individual to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of any embryos 
following infertility treatment—the individual shall be provided with the option of storing, donating 
to another person, donating for research, or disposing of unused embryos); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
111L § 4 (West 2005) (providing that patients shall be supplied with timely, relevant, and appropriate 
information to allow them to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of 
embryos and that patients will be provided with an informational pamphlet describing the aspects of 
the IVF process as well as an informed consent form stating the patient has received and reviewed said 
pamphlet); N.J. STAT ANN. § 26:2Z-2 (West 2004) (stating that a health care provider shall supply an 
infertility patient with timely, relevant, and appropriate information sufficient to allow that person to 
make an informed and voluntary choice regarding the disposition of embryos following infertility 
treatment and that donation of embryos must be accompanied by written consent). 
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is clearly stated.83 This statute is a solid start.84 California has taken a step 
in the right direction by putting the decision in the hands of the couple 
undergoing fertility treatment. 
The decision to begin the IVF process is an intensely personal one, 
and all contingencies should be left in the couple’s hands to decide. 
Requiring that couples provide for the disposition is an important step; 
moreover, it is significant that the couples receive informed consent and 
mutually agree on the matter chosen. An intensely personal matter ought 
to remain that way—intensely personal.85 Agreements regarding 
disposition in the event of separation or divorce should be both required 
and enforced. By including these provisions in a statute, power would 
remain with the couples, not with the fickle courts.86 However, what 
California lacks is a clause requiring and enforcing such agreements.87 
Requiring dispositional decisions regarding frozen embryos in the 
event of divorce forces couples to make a decision and plan; effectively 
forcing the couples’ hand will make them consider what they truly desire 
for their embryos, rather than saving the tough conversation for an 
expensive legal battle down the road.88 Enforcing said agreements also 
assures couples that the dispositional choices they make in the forms are 
                                                     
 83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(b)(3)(A)–(F) (West 2004); see also Judith Daar, 
Whose Embryo Is It Anyway? California Finally Takes a Stand, 58 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 34 (2016) 
(“California has surprisingly lagged in one key area of ART law—the disposition of frozen embryos 
at divorce or separation of the progenitors.”). 
 84. See Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model 
for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 381 (2013) (stating that the California statute is 
silent on whether the dispositions will constitute an enforceable legal agreement between the couple 
if their relationship ends). 
 85. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1988) (“Explicit agreements . . . are all the 
more necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive choice, where the intangible costs of 
any litigation are simply incalculable. Advance directives, subject to mutual change of mind that must 
be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving 
to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal, private 
decision.”). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Daar, supra note 83, at 39. The author distinguishes Findley v. Lee and the public dispute 
between TV-actress Sofia Vergara and her now ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Loeb, regarding the disposition 
of two frozen embryos. Id. Findley and Lee and Vergara and Loeb were offered the opportunity to 
express their dispositional preferences and intent for their embryos. Id. However, the clinic consent 
forms signed by Vergara and Loeb were incomplete because they did not provide directions for 
disposition in the event of separation. Id. 
 88. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Erik W. Johnson, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition 
through Contract, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 793, 820 (2003) (“The benefits of upholding agreements over 
preembryo disposition (as well as legislation that requires such contracts to be made) are clarity, 
certainty, efficiency, and flexibility.”). 
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concrete.89 Without a promise of enforcement, there will be no end to the 
litigation and uncertainty of the disposition of embryos. 
B. Louisiana 
Louisiana takes a starkly opposite approach to disposition compared 
to California. Under Louisiana law, a human embryo is defined as “an in 
vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law, composed 
of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified 
and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child,”90 and is 
granted the legal status of a juridical person.91 Louisiana law strictly 
prohibits the intentional destruction of a viable embryo92 and states that 
the judicial standard for disposition of the embryo shall be in the best 
interest of the embryo.93 
The recognition of an embryo as a juridical person surpasses the 
commonly accepted notion that embryos are of a unique character because 
of the potential for human life.94 In the statutes regulating the disposition 
of embryos, couples’ only option for disposition is to allow another couple 
to “adopt”95 the embryos.96 This embryo-centered legislation effectively 
                                                     
 89. Findley v. Lee, 378 Ill. App. 3d 1136 (2008) (holding that the form the couple completed 
electing to thaw and discard the embryos in the event of divorce controls and the intent of the parties 
at the time must be given conclusive effect); see also Daar, supra note 83, at 37 (“[T]he holding in 
[Findley v. Lee] is significant for both its clarity and for its position within the larger jurisprudence 
governing embryo disputes. That is, in adopting a contract-specific approach, the court essentially 
declined to apply other legal frameworks used in sister jurisdictions.”); Maura Dolan, Divorced 
Couple’s Frozen Embryos Must Be ‘Thawed and Discarded,’ Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-frozen-embryos-20151118-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9BJD-PVUH]. 
 90. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (1986). 
 91. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:124 (1986). 
 92. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (1986) (stating an inviable embryo is one that fails to develop over 
a thirty-six hour period, except when the embryo is in a state of cryopreservation—and is therefore 
not a juridical person). 
 93. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (1986); see also Kellie LaGatta, Comment, The Frozen Embryo 
Debate Heats Up: A Call for Federal Regulation and Legislation, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 99, 108 (2003) 
(“If the donors dispute over the frozen embryos, the courts follow the ‘best interests of the child’ 
philosophy to resolve conflicts among the parties involved.”). 
 94. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992). 
 95. Debele & Crockin, supra note 11, at 67 (explaining that there is a debate among 
professionals, policymakers, and the public as to the use of the term “adoption” as opposed to 
“donation”). The issue is linked to the dispute over the classification of embryos: persons, property, 
or something in between. The term “adoption” tends to be used by advocates of characterizing embryos 
as persons, with the view that the disposition of such embryos should be governed by the best interests 
of the child, which might often mean adoption. Id. 
 96. LaGatta, supra note 93, at 108 (“The Louisiana statute explicitly states that ‘an in vitro 
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person’ and is thus entitled to the same rights as human 
beings and is not property of the donors. The statute punishes the intentional destruction of the 
embryos because of their status as human beings, and the only way to avoid this punishment is for the 
donor to relinquish any rights to the embryos and make the embryos available for adoption.”). 
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ignores the wishes of the couple who created the embryos. Disputes 
regarding these embryos are pushed through the main entrance of 
courtrooms for judges to decide the best interest of the embryo, which 
would likely always lead to the embryo being born.97 If one thing is clear, 
it is that more litigation in IVF is not needed. Rather, clarity to the opaque 
legal landscape of IVF disputes should be brought forth by the legislature 
and should stem from the parties’ own decision making, not the courts’. 
C. Arizona 
In August 2018, Arizona adopted the newest piece of legislation on 
the disposition of embryos that is also the first of its kind.98 The law states 
that, in the event of a dispute regarding the disposition of in vitro human 
embryos, the court shall award the embryos to the spouse who intends to 
allow the embryos to develop to birth.99 The wording of the statute itself 
states that extensive litigation is necessary, and the law cannot facially 
provide a cut-and-dry solution. Simply telling courts to award custody to 
the party who intends to allow the embryo to develop to birth may work if 
one party seeks to destroy the embryo and the other party does not. 
However, consider what happens when both parties desire custody of the 
embryo; the Arizona statute attempts to solve this problem by providing 
the following: 
If both spouses intend to allow the in vitro human embryos to develop 
to birth and both spouses provided their gametes for the in vitro 
human embryos, [the court shall] resolve any dispute on the 
disposition of the in vitro human embryos in a manner that provides 
the best chance for the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth.100 
The crux of the issue is how courts will then determine who or what 
will provide the best chance for the in vitro human embryos to develop to 
birth. Determining this new amorphous issue will likely lead to the 
creation of a new—flawed—balancing test or a best interests analysis 
when there is no evidence to weigh what would be in the future child’s 
best interest.101 When both parties intend to allow the embryo to develop 
                                                     
 97. Strasser, supra note 25, at 1201 (“In most if not all cases, it would be better for the child to 
live than never to exist[.]”). 
 98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018). 
 99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(A)(1) (2018). 
 100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(A)(2) (2018). 
 101. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 2003) (critiquing the use of the 
best interests of the child approach when determining the disposition of embryos by noting that IVF 
custody disputes do not involve maximizing physical and emotional contact between the parents and 
the child. Instead, they involve the “more fundamental decision of whether the parties will be parents 
at all”). The court further notes that it would be “premature” to consider which parent is in the best 
position to raise a child when said “child” is frozen in a storage facility. Id. Here, the court is effectively 
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to birth, it becomes circular for the law to mandate that the court must 
make its decision in the manner that provides the best chance for the 
embryo to develop to birth. In effect, the law protects the embryos, not the 
interests of the parties who created the embryos.102 
The only remedy provided for a party who does not want the embryos 
to develop is their release from parental responsibilities and no right, 
obligation, or interest with respect to any child resulting from the 
embryos—unless the spouse consents to being a parent.103 Here, all power 
is taken away from one or both partners; they cannot make individualized 
dispositional choices. Instead, the choice will be made for the parties by 
the court.104 
D. Florida 
Florida’s statute is on the cusp of being considered a model statute 
because it unflinchingly places the power in the couples’ hands, not in the 
courts’.105 The first section of the statute provides that a couple and the 
treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the 
disposition of the “commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm, and preembryos 
in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen 
circumstance.”106 The statute further provides for the event where there is 
no written agreement, mandating that any remaining eggs or sperm shall 
remain under the control of the party who provided the eggs or sperm, or 
                                                     
being asked to decide which party has a better likelihood of allowing the embryo to develop to birth; 
determining this issue will lead to a balancing test of, among other things, the parties’ relative financial 
status, the parties’ intangible future plans, and so on. 
 102. The legislation was enacted largely in response to an Arizona case between Ruby Torres 
and John Joseph Terrell, where the judge was tasked with balancing Torres’ interest in being a parent 
against Terrell’s interest in not being a parent; the judge ruled the embryos should be put up for 
adoption. Cha quotes Torres, saying, “So both of us would have a child out there . . . . We just wouldn’t 
be raising the child, and 18 years down the road if she or he wanted to find us he or she can and 
probably will.” Ariana Eunjung Cha, Who Gets the Embryos? Whoever Wants to Make Them into 
Babies, New Law Says, WASH. POST (July 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/national/health-science/who-gets-the-embryos-whoever-wants-to-make-them-into-babies-new-law-
says/2018/07/17/8476b840-7e0d-11e8-bb6b-c1cb691f1402_story.html?utm_term=.9a44a989202c 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03(C) (2018). 
 104. See Cha, supra note 102 (“The American Society for Reproductive Medicine, which 
represents doctors, nurses and other professionals who work on fertility issues, opposed the measure, 
arguing that it would have a profound impact on reproductive medicine. To protect patient choice, the 
measure would force clinics to ship embryos out of state for storage, increasing the risk of accidents, 
the society argued. It said the measure would hurt stem-cell research . . . because scarce embryos 
would be tied up in legal battles and not be available to be donated to science.”). 
 105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1993). 
 106. Id. 
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the decision-making authority shall reside jointly with the commissioning 
couple.107 
A potential issue with the statute lies in subsection (2). It is, perhaps 
eerily, reminiscent of the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.108 In 
principle, the two are similar; both ideas essentially promote the notion 
that the embryos should remain frozen until the parties can reach an 
agreement.109 The issue becomes tougher because deciding the disposition 
is exceptionally difficult and, without a contract, court guidance may be 
needed.110 Emotions are fraught when couples face the prospect of divorce 
and losing embryos; while a dispositional decision is difficult at the 
beginning of the IVF process, it is likely easier for couples to agree on a 
contract at the beginning, a time of hope, rather than at the end of a 
marriage.111 The Florida statute is concerning in that it may lead to 
litigation in the event the commissioning couple cannot reach an 
agreement, thus requiring a judicial decision. Compared with the Arizona 
and Louisiana statutes, the Florida law effectively keeps more cases out of 
court.112 
                                                     
 107. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(1)–(2) (West 1993). 
 108. Flannery, supra note 18, at 255 (explaining the contemporaneous mutual consent approach 
as a less strict approach to the enforcement of contracts regarding embryo disposition by allowing 
parties to change their minds from their original agreement upon changed circumstances, such as 
divorce); see also Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that it will serve public 
policy to allow parties to voluntarily decide the disposition of frozen embryos in advance of 
cryopreservation, subject to mutual change of mind); Forman, supra note 84, at 385 (explaining that 
courts that follow the contemporaneous mutual consent approach will not enforce embryo disposition 
agreements between the parties when one party has changed his or her mind); Walker, supra note 29, 
at 51 (discussing the approach the Roman court took in reaching its holding). 
 109. Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the Time of Divorce, 
25 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 189 (2014) (explaining that the contemporaneous mutual consent 
approach proposes that the embryo should not be used by either partner, donated, used in research, or 
destroyed without the consent of both parties). 
 110. Id. at 183 (stating the language in subsection (2) does not provide much guidance for 
divorcing couples). 
 111. Forman, supra note 84, at 388–90. The author explains the extraordinary emotional 
difficulty couples face when making dispositional decisions. Forman cites one study, which states that 
almost fifty percent of individuals surveyed felt “distressed” about making a decision regarding 
embryo disposition, and another study reported patients felt “anguished” and “agonized” over such a 
decision. Id. at 388. Forman further notes that the patients felt that the decision-making process was 
“often marked by ambivalence, discomfort, and uncertainty.” Id. Further, Forman states that often, at 
the beginning of the process, patients do not anticipate the challenge that “surplus” frozen embryos 
will pose and do not give the decision enough careful thought. Id. at 391. Post-treatment, according to 
Forman, couples frequently experience “high decisional conflict,” as well as a conflict between 
partners. Id. However, although the decision-making process may not be as seriously considered at 
the beginning, it is no doubt an easier time to reach an agreement than at the end of a marriage when 
a custody battle is looming. 
 112. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318.03 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (1986). 
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III. A NEW BEGINNING AND A MODEL STATUTORY RESPONSE 
It is tempting to state that the federal government should enact a 
statute that regulates embryo disposition across all fifty states.113 However, 
this country needs to preserve the principles of federalism; a federal statute 
mandating disposition of embryos is not the solution. This nation is 
grounded in principles of federalism, and that fact should not change with 
regard to IVF regulations. However, it is no secret that states often model 
their laws off other states’ statutes—this can be observed by reading the 
statutes listed above.114 Why, then, should there not be a model statute 
proposed that states may look to and adopt? States are aware of the 
problems with courts determining embryo disposition without any 
statutory guidance.115 The proposed model statute will merge with the 
courts’ favored contractual approach but will make the contractual 
approach the only approach. 
A. The Contractual Approach and Its Application to the Model Statute 
State public policy and reluctance to enact legislation stymies court 
efforts to follow a cut-and-dry approach to disposition determinations.116 
Courts have long held that they should honor an initial agreement between 
parties when determining the disposition of frozen embryos.117 Still, courts 
grapple with the question of how disposition should be decided when the 
parties dispute the initial agreement.118 The answer is simple: parties 
should not be able to change their minds. Dispositional decisions regarding 
embryos deserve weighty consideration—but that consideration should 
take place at the beginning of the process and remain binding.119 
                                                     
 113. But see Faver, supra note 71, at 634 (proposing a model federal statute regarding the 
disposition of embryos); LaGatta, supra note 93, at 111 (arguing that “federal uniform policy regarding 
disposition of frozen embryos and the participation in the IVF process is a must”). 
 114. See Fruchtman, supra note 71. It is readily apparent that many of these statutes are identical 
to one another, in both principle and wording, except for a few outliers. 
 115. Cha, supra note 102. 
 116. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992) (“[G]iven the relevant principles of 
constitutional law, the existing public policy of Tennessee with regard to unborn life . . . and the 
ethical considerations that [we] have developed in response to that scientific knowledge, there can be 
no easy answer to the question we now face.”); see generally Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012). 
 117. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (“We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding 
disposition of any untransferred [preembryos] in the event of contingencies . . . should be presumed 
valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.”). The Davis court goes on to state that life 
is not static, and agreements should be able to be later modified by agreement, but in the absence of 
such agreed modification, the original agreement should be binding. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Forman, supra note 84, at 388–90. But see A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 
2000) (holding that even if the husband and wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between 
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A statutory solution to the courts’ dilemma comes packaged as a 
model that closely resembles those of California and Florida.120 As in 
California, statutes must promote the supply of “timely, relevant, and 
appropriate information” to patients seeking infertility treatment.121 This 
information helps enlighten the decision-making process as patients 
prepare to provide a directive as to how remaining embryos should be 
handled. 
An advance directive should also be required by statute, with the 
caveat that it is binding.122 While evidence shows that couples do not 
seriously consider dispositional decisions at the preliminary stage of the 
IVF process, as a matter of public policy, they must. If they still do not 
give appropriate consideration to the disposition of their embryos then it 
must be a matter of “buyer beware.” 123 The public policy is twofold: first, 
and obviously, the decision to undergo IVF treatment should not be taken 
lightly, and couples must plan for every contingency, including the 
unhappy prospect of divorce or separation; second, allowing couples to 
change their minds will only lead to the same litigation that has occurred 
for the past twenty-six years.124 Yes, the Davis court conceded that if both 
couples change their minds but mutually agree on an alternative to the 
initial agreement, then said agreement need not be honored.125 However, 
                                                     
themselves regarding the disposition of frozen preembryos, the court would still refuse to enforce an 
agreement that would compel one donor to become a parent against their will). 
 120. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (West 2004); FL. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 
1993). 
 121. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (West 2004); see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, 
Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational 
Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 619 (2011) (arguing healthcare facilities need to do more to 
engage intended parents at the outset to help them make a disposition decision). 
 122. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(b) (West 2004). But see Coleman, supra note 11, 
at 57 (arguing that requiring couples to make binding decisions about the disposition of remaining 
embryos undermines, rather than promotes, procreative liberty). 
 123. Forman, supra note 84, at 388–90. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 121, at 619 (arguing that 
couples should be urged to consider the fate of remaining embryos, the legal and ethical ramifications 
of dispositional choices, as well as the possible circumstances that may result in disputes in advance). 
 124. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. 174, 180 (N.Y. 1988). The court noted the importance of 
honoring original agreements, while also noting the difficulties of considering every contingency. The 
court stated, 
While the value of arriving at explicit agreements is apparent, we also recognize the 
extraordinary difficulty such an exercise presents. All agreements looking to the future to 
some extent deal with the unknown. Here, however, the uncertainties inherent in the IVF 
process itself are vastly complicated by cryopreservation, which . . . allows time for minds, 
and circumstances to change. Divorce; death, disappearance or incapacity of one or both 
partners; aging; the birth of other children are but a sampling of the obvious changes in 
individual circumstances that might take place over time. These factors make it particularly 
important that courts seek to honor the parties’ expressions of choice, made before disputes 
erupt, with the parties’ over-all direction always uppermost in the analysis.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 125. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
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in a contentious custody battle, it should be no surprise that emotions are 
fraught and couples are not likely to agree, so the contemporaneous mutual 
consent model examined by courts like Davis is ultimately not realistic. 
Thus, making preliminary agreements required and binding will halt 
potential litigation in its tracks and provide a bright line, cut-and-dry rule 
to a hot-button issue.126 
The imposition of a binding agreement is where this model statute 
diverges from Florida’s.127 Florida, perhaps wisely, provides for the event 
that there is no initial agreement between the commissioning couple.128 
Under the model statute, such an event would not be a possibility. While 
the Florida statute aims to keep the power with the couple by stating that 
the dispositional decision still rests with the couple even when there is no 
agreement, in cases of divorce or separation that still opens the door to 
litigation.129 
The proposed model statute also, above all else, aims to maintain the 
commissioning couple’s agency and decision-making authority.130 It is 
logical and right that the dispositional decision ought to remain with the 
couple whose genetic material created the embryo.131 The statute would 
mandate that couples exercise their authority at the preliminary stage of 
                                                     
 126. But see Marold, supra note 109, at 196. Marold cites research conducted in 2010 by the 
Department of Social Medicine at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which found that 
parties feel extreme difficulty at being forced to make a decision and concluded that informed consent 
forms should be reviewed by the couples every so often. Id. Marold asserts that research suggests the 
clinic consent form should not be considered a legally binding contractual agreement. Id. 
 127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(2) (West 1993). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Authors such as Faver and LaGatta propose that federal legislation include the caveat that 
parties must participate in counseling and receive authorization before beginning the IVF process. See 
Faver, supra note 71, at 639 (“[P]sychological counseling will not only be mandatory for the facility 
to offer, but also mandatory for the participants to attend in order to move forward with IVF. The 
mental health professional is required to sign off that the participants fully understand the 
consequences of going through the IVF process and that neither party was pressured into making the 
disposition decision.”); LaGatta, supra note 93, at 114 (“[L]egislation should also proscribe that 
couples undergo counseling and receive authorization prior to participating in an IVF program.”). The 
model statute set forth in this Comment will not include any such provision; in the interest of 
maintaining individual autonomy and mirroring the experience many couples undergo when 
conceiving naturally (meaning that counseling is not required before attempting to conceive naturally), 
couples should be free to make the decision to begin the IVF process at their discretion. See also J.B. 
v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001) (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597) (“As they are both 
contributors of the genetic material comprising the preembryos, the decision should be theirs to 
maintain.”). 
 131. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 88 (stating that a central aspect of procreative freedom is 
the right to make contemporaneous decisions about how one’s reproductive capacity will be used); 
see also In re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that absent 
a countervailing policy, it is just and proper to dispose of the embryos in the manner that the parties 
chose at the time they began the IVF process). 
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the process.132 This would make the agreement required, binding, and most 
importantly, preserve the couples’ authority.133 The proposed statute 
allows them to exercise their wishes in the event of contingencies, such as 
death, separation, or divorce, while keeping their authority from being 
displaced into the unpredictable hands of the courts.134 
B. The Status of Embryos Under the Model Statute 
Courts have held that embryos are entitled to special respect because 
of the potential for human life;135 essentially, they are an intermediary 
between persons136 and property. As such, courts are still grappling with a 
meaningful way to dispose of them while still honoring the rights of the 
progenitors.137 Inherent in every case is the acknowledgment of the 
                                                     
 132. But see Coleman, supra note 11, at 106 (“Decisions about having children should be made 
in the spirit of trust and mutual cooperation, not as part of a negotiated deal backed by the force of 
law.”); Cori Schreider, Cryopreserved Embryo Disputes: Weighing Interests Regarding Genetic 
Parenthood, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 75, 80 (2017) (stating that evidence reveals that contracts 
and consent forms are not a reliable method of determining the disposition of embryos). Although 
requiring couples to form a binding directive at the preliminary stages of the process may seem cold, 
it is a reality that there will be remaining embryos whose fate must be determined. One might argue 
that the process should be as close to the process of natural conception as possible. However, the stark 
reality is that when children are born naturally, there are no “remainders” or “leftovers” to consider; 
in an IVF process, there are leftover embryos to be stored and potentially used, so couples must 
consider the future of those embryos in a manner different than a couple who can conceive naturally. 
See Coleman, supra note 11, at 110 (“[T]he process of leaving advance instructions will force the 
couple to consider carefully the implications of creating multiple embryos, including the possibility 
that they may create more embryos than they will ever use.”). 
 133. Forman, supra note 84, at 433 (“We could also see [enforceability] as freedom-enhancing. 
One person’s freedom to change his or her mind comes at the expense of another’s freedom to rely on 
a promised disposition to choose a particular option. Without the opportunity to contract, all parties 
would be subject to the default rules of the jurisdiction, which might eliminate an option (such as using 
the embryos despite the other’s objection) or be forced to submit the determination under a less specific 
standard for resolution, taking the matter out of the parties’ hands. Either result would circumscribe, 
rather than enhance, the parties’ freedom.”). 
 134. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 464–65. (“The argument for recognizing the binding effect 
of joint advance instructions and acceptance of IVF program conditions rests on several grounds. The 
right to use embryos to reproduce or to avoid procreation should include the right to give binding 
advance instructions because certainty about consequences is necessary to exercise reproductive 
options. In addition, all parties gain from the ability to rely on prior instructions when future 
contingencies occur. Finally, it minimizes the frequency and cost of resolving disputes that arise over 
disposition of embryos.”). 
 135. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; see also Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 1256, 1271 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that preembryos occupy an interim category between mere human 
tissue and persons because of their potential to become persons, and such embryos are due varying 
degrees of special respect dependent on the issue involved). 
 136. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding no embryo enjoys protection as 
a “person” under federal law); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 137. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d 558; In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Kass 
v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); see also 
LaGatta, supra note 93, at 101 (arguing that embryos need a definitive status and, because there is no 
uniform law assigning a status to embryos, courts are forced to “reluctantly turn to one of four 
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fundamental right both to be a parent and not to be a parent.138 Moreover, 
the interests of the party who desires not to be a parent often win and the 
embryo is ordered to be destroyed;139 thus, despite the unique status 
embryos are said to maintain, the rights of the progenitor often trump any 
consideration given to the embryo. The model statute would maintain the 
special status of the embryos while taking power away from the court to 
disregard the special status in favor of progenitor rights. The basic solution 
is this: allow the couples to decide at the earliest stage of the IVF process—
when they are filling out the forms and choosing the disposition of their 
embryos themselves.140 Inherent in the couples’ decision will be a 
recognition of the status conferred on their embryos. As a matter of policy, 
it is better for couples to assign meaning or status to the embryos they 
created, by determining their disposition according to their mutual wishes, 
than for the court to assign its own unscrupulous determination of what 
the embryos are worth to individual couples.141 
C. Safeguards 
Present in many contracts is the possibility that the contract lacked a 
manifestation of assent or a meeting of the minds between the parties, and 
                                                     
hypotheses, involving the status of the frozen embryos: (1) the constitutional view of the United States 
Supreme Court; (2) the embryo as a person; (3) the embryo as property; (4) the embryo deserves 
special consideration”). LaGatta states that the view that embryos deserve special respect is the most 
widely accepted of the four hypotheses. Id. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees “the right of the individual to . . . marry, establish a home 
and bring up children”). 
 139. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (holding that, ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid 
procreation has the greater interest and should prevail). 
 140. But see Rita Lowery Gitchell, Should Legal Precedent Based on Old, Flawed, Scientific 
Analysis Regarding When Life Begins, Continue to Apply to Parental Disputes over the Fate of Frozen 
Embryos, When There Are Now Scientifically Known and Observed Facts Proving Life Begins at 
Fertilization?, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 2–3 (2018) (asserting that courts, by recognizing 
human embryos as human beings, should “evaluate contracts that describe embryos as mere property 
as invalid, under known scientific fact, refuse to allow contract law to condemn human life, and only 
consider actual advance directives concerning the embryos, in light of the embryos’ best interests”); 
see also Michelle L. Anderson, Are You My Mommy? A Call for Regulation of Embryo Donation, 35 
CAP. U. L. REV. 589, 606–07 (2006) (using existing case law as examples of the need for uniform 
legislation in every state that establishes the legal status of embryos). 
 141. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 437, 452 (1990) (“At issue in determining legal status are several questions relating to the locus 
and scope of decisional authority over embryos . . . the question is what actors have decisional 
authority, may they exercise that authority in advance . . . .”); Diane K. Yang, What’s Mine Is Mine, 
but What’s Yours Should Also be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes That Mandate the Implantation 
of Frozen Preembryos, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 617 (2002) (“[T]he participants’ interests, as reflected by 
their agreement, would be the courts’ primary concern if litigation occurs. Advance directives, 
therefore, sidestep the need to classify [preembryos] as either persons or property.”). 
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there is always a concern for unconscionability.142 A central issue arises if 
the treatment provider does not follow protocol in explaining the relevant, 
appropriate, and timely information to patients before the advance 
directive is executed.143 In the event of a failure to follow the statutorily 
prescribed protocol, thus resulting in an invalid contract, the dispositional 
choice should not be made for the couple.144 
Policy dictates that the couples’ ability to choose what happens to the 
embryos should not be taken away from them. The commissioning couple 
should not be stripped of their agency because a treatment provider failed 
to follow the statutorily prescribed duties. The model statute will provide 
that in the event there is no valid agreement between the parties (and the 
parties are unable to agree), then the parties must participate in mandatory 
mediation.145  
The model statute will mirror California’s statute in that failure to 
follow procedural steps will constitute unprofessional conduct and result 
in a monetary penalty.146 Such a provision will put facilities and treatment 
providers on notice that their conduct will be monitored and procedures 
must be followed. 
                                                     
 142. Forman, supra note 84, at 437 (arguing that standard assumptions about bargaining power 
are not of great concern in this type of arrangement and that embryo disposition agreements, unlike 
premarital agreements, are less likely to be inherently unfair). 
 143. See Faver, supra note 71, at 640; see also Ashley Alenick, Pre-Embryo Custody Battles: 
How Predisposition Contracts Could Be the Winning Solution, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1897, 1910 
(2017) (proposing that predisposition contracts should be separate from informed consent forms in the 
interest of preserving procedural fairness and assuring dispositional directives are based on full 
disclosure). Timely, relevant, and appropriate information can include confidentiality protections, all 
possible dispositional options, length of storage, destruction procedures, etc. For more information 
regarding informed consent procedures, see AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF FAMILY LAW’S COMM. ON 
REPROD. AND GENETIC TECH., AM. BAR ASS’N MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. 
TECH. §§ 201–03 (2008), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/family_law_ 
quarterly/family_flq_artmodelact.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F8F-H9SB]. 
 144. But see Faver, supra note 71, at 640. In Faver’s proposed federal statute, she provides 
default rules in the event the contract is found unconscionable—the embryos will be thawed out—and 
the couples must be made aware of the default disposition to ensure knowledge of what will happen if 
the agreement is found invalid. 
 145. This proposed provision loosely follows the structure of Florida’s statute but takes it a step 
further by ensuring couples engage in mediation in order to come to a decision regarding the embryos. 
Mediation provides a more relaxed, congenial environment than a courtroom, while also keeping the 
power in the hands of the couple, rather than a judge, because a mediator exists to facilitate, not 
mandate. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(2) (West 1993); see also Advantages of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, LEGAL SERVICES COMM’N (Jul. 31, 2014), https://lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch27s10s01.php 
[https://perma.cc/67S9-FS54]. 
 146. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315(a) (West 2004). The proposed model statute will 
take a finding of unprofessional conduct a step further by imposing a monetary penalty if statutory 
procedures are not followed in the attempt to channel and regulate providers’ behavior. 
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With safeguards in place, the statute will protect the validity of 
contracts while also protecting parties’ interests concerning the disposition 
of the embryos. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that state response to an ever-growing issue is mostly 
unsatisfactory.147 With case law being inconsistent, inequitable, and, in a 
word, disastrous, a response is needed—and quickly.148 Existing state 
legislation needs to be revisited, and the vast number of states without 
legislation need to respond to a problem that will not simply vanish.149 
The most crucial objective in implementing state legislation is 
preserving individuals’ autonomy and procreative rights.150 Litigation 
places the decisions in the hands of the courts, which are then forced to 
weigh two equitable interests—the interest in procreating and the interest 
in not procreating—against one another.151 In cases where the contractual 
approach is not adopted, and instead the balancing test is employed, one 
person’s procreative autonomy is taken away in the interest of preserving 
the other party’s interests.152 As a matter of public policy and in the interest 
of individual liberty, these decisions ought to be left to the parties 
themselves to determine their interest in their procreative autonomy, as 
well as how they assign meaning to the status of their remaining 
embryos.153 When courts are forced to engage with these issues, however 
                                                     
 147. LaGatta, supra note 93, at 115. LaGatta states that, as reproductive technology advances, 
the number of couples participating in IVF will continue to grow, and the number of disputes that arise 
regarding the disposition of embryos will also continue to grow. Id.; see Tim Schlesinger, Embryo 
Disposition upon Separation or Divorce, 4 SCITECH LAW. 22, 25 (2016) (concluding that “[o]ne thing 
is certain: [t]his is an issue that cries out for responsible legislation. The millions of couples undergoing 
fertility treatments (as well as the physicians and healthcare professionals) deserve to know the answer 
to these questions before they spend years in litigation trying to find out”). 
 148. LaGatta, supra note 93, at 115 (arguing that without federal legislation, many more disputes 
will be brought to courts). 
 149. See supra note 72 for a list of statutes currently in effect; strikingly few states attempt to 
deal with the specific issues associated with IVF, while many allow consent to be withdrawn or 
provide a release from parental responsibilities. 
 150. Universal among case law is the interest in preserving procreational rights. See generally 
Coleman, supra note 11 (arguing for an inalienable rights approach for determining the disposition of 
embryos that prioritizes the couples’ procreational autonomy, going so far as that a person’s current 
objection would take precedence over prior consent). 
 151. See generally, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018); Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 152. See generally, e.g., Rooks, 429 P.3d 579; Davis, 842 S.W.2d 558. 
 153. Robertson, supra note 12, at 424. 
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reluctantly, they yield devastating results that leave one person, or 
sometimes both parties, disappointed, confused, and disturbed.154 
The provisions in the model statute are aimed at maintaining 
procreational autonomy and individual liberty by allowing parties to enter 
into a reliable agreement that will determine the disposition of embryos in 
a manner they see fit. While making such agreements binding may draw 
criticism, primarily because the statute provides no leeway for couples to 
change their minds, it also ensures that these contracts will be dependable 
and will keep couples out of court; it forces couples to seriously plan for a 
future they responsibly need to consider. Binding agreements will 
substantially reduce litigation that leads to inequitable results. 
Furthermore, requiring mandatory mediation will enable parties to settle 
their disputes out of court with a facilitator, rather than a decision maker, 
which will maintain parties’ agency and independence. 
Under the model statute’s guidance, states will be able to enforce 
legislation that simultaneously helps guarantee individual liberty while 
enabling couples to safely and assuredly navigate the IVF process. 
                                                     
 154. Cha, supra note 102. See generally Rooks, 429 P.3d 579; Kass, 696 N.E.2d 150; Reber, 42 
A.3d 1131; Davis, 842 S.W.2d 558. 
